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The paper discusses the consequences of price-setting by firms  under monopolistic competition 
in dynamic models.  It is assumed that costs of price adjustment are speed-dependent.  The 
Keynesian regime prevails when firms choose  a point on the demand curve. If real labour 
costs  are relatively high, customers may be rationed. After analysing firm behaviour in a 
partial equilibrium setting, demand  is made endogeneous  in a full-scope  macroeconomic 
model.  Numerical  examples  are  worked through  by  applying  the  technique  of  multiple 
shooting.  It is found that relatively small costs of  price adjustment give rise to substantial 
macroeconomic effects. 
INTRODUCTION 
The time-honoured  question  of  price-setting remains an important issue  in 
economic theory. Market-clearing conducted by a Walrasian auctioneer does 
not provide us with a realistic picture for most markets. A natural way out is 
to  assume  oligopoly  or  monopolistic  competition  among  firms. As  is  well 
known, imperfect competition  leads to inefficiency. Macroeconomic  models 
based on monopolistic competition even exhibit Keynesian features, as shown 
in a seminal paper by Hart (1982). However, this is not the complete story. 
There is ample evidence that prices react with a lag to changes in demand. 
Price inertia can be explained in several ways. One way to do so is to assume 
that price  changes  are  costly,  as  emphasized  by  Barro (1972),  Rotemberg 
(1982) and others. 
The present paper discusses the consequences of monopolistic competition 
and costly price adjustment in a dynamic macroeconomic  model.  Firms are 
supposed to  have perfect foresight. It is shown that a demand shock has a 
substantial effect on output in the short run even if the costs of price adjustment 
are  moderate.  This  can  be  explained  by  demand  externalities  in  case  of 
monopolistic  competition,  as  emphasized  in  recent papers by  Akerlof  and 
Yellen (1985a, b) and by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1985). Supply shocks give 
rise to a similar impact in the short run. In both cases, the economy  adjusts 
towards a Nash-Cournot  equilibrium in the long run. 
Restrictions on the flexibility of prices may lead to rationing in markets. 
If firms produce according to demand, the situation can be characterised as 
'Keynesian'. A 'classical regime' would prevail if  customers are rationed by 
firms to  avoid  losses  in  production.  It is  found  that in the  present model 
rationing of  customers is less  likely in comparison with the case of  perfect 
competition because monopoly profits form a buffer in the event of unexpected 
shocks. There remains the possibility of rationing of firms in the market for 
labour.  However,  following  Blanchard  and  Sachs  (1982),  the  regime  of 
'repressed inflation' will be eliminated by postulating that households  supply 
all the labour demanded by firms. On the other hand, involuntary unemploy- 
ment is taken into account by assuming sluggish wage adjustment. 204  ECONOMICA  [MAY 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section I the optimal behaviour of 
firms  under monopolistic competition and perfect foresight is analysed. Section 
II  builds  on  the  results  of  this  analysis  by  incorporating the  behavioural 
equations in a model of the whole economy. Since the choice of the paper is 
to focus on the role of firms, demand for money and goods will be modelled 
as simply as possible.  Simulation results of  this macroeconomic  model  are 
discussed in Section III. The paper closes with some conclusions. 
I.  OPTIMAL  BEHAVIOUR  OF  FIRMS  UNDER  PERFECT  FORESIGHT 
Output of firm  j, say yj, is non-storable and can be produced by a neoclassical 
production function 
(1)  yj =f(lj,  kj)  fl,fk,  fkl>  0;  fil,  fkk  <0 
where  Ij denotes  labour  and  kj stands for the  capital  stock  of  firm j. The 
production function is linear homogeneous.  Both consumers and producers 
demand good j. The demand function for the product of firm  j is of the constant 
elasticity form 
(2)  Yi  = aj  )  i  nj  1 
where pj is the (nominal) price of the good produced by firm  j, P is the average 
price level and aj is a constant determining the position of the demand curve 
for good j. 
Capital accumulation depends  on gross investment, ij, and depreciation: 
(3)  kj=ij-6kj,  8?0. 
Depreciation is exponential  at a rate 8. To derive a well-behaved investment 
function,  installation costs of capital are introduced. The investment expen- 
diture function including these costs is written as 
(4)  gj = g(iq, kj)g  gi > 0,  gk <  0,  gii >  ?. 
The function is assumed to be convex in ij and homogeneous  of degree 1 in 
its arguments i1 and kj. 
The adjustment of prices may be costly for two reasons. First, there are 
administrative costs of changing price lists, informing dealers, etc. These costs 
are independent of the direction or magnitude of the price change; they are 
a lump-sum type of costs. Administrative cost or 'small menu' cost, as they 
have been recently termed, will not be taken into account here. Second, there 
is the implicit cost resulting from unfavourable reactions of customers to large 
price changes. Such price changes may harm the reputation of firms. These 
costs, which are called information cost by Barro (1972), are speed-dependent 
(say, quadratic), as customers may well prefer small and recurrent  price changes 
to more infrequent but larger ones.  In reality, both types of  cost may have 
some significance. Here, we take company with Rotemberg (1983) in arguing 
that information  costs  are probably more  important in  an  environment in 
which the price level moves little. However, further empirical research may 
be needed  to  solve the issue.  Casual observation of  actual price changes is 
not a substitute for adequate testing. 1988]  PRICE  INERTIA  IN  MONOPOLISTIC  COMPETITION  205 
Information costs may be conceived  as a temporary shift of the demand 
curve facing a firm. Such temporary shifts in the demand curve can be allowed 
for by adapting the demand function (2) as follows:2 
(2a  aj(  {  O  >p 
O.  > 0 
As an alternative, let us consider the following  argument. Firms may prefer 
to avoid temporary shifts of demand in the face of price changes. This may 
be realized at the expense of costly information to convince customers of the 
necessity  of  the  change  in  prices.  Moreover, firms may prevent temporary 
shifts in demand by increasing normal advertising. Larger  price changes would 
require a larger effort on the part of firms. This line of  reasoning implies a 
separate cost of adjustment function, which, bearing in mind equation (2a), 
would be 
(5)  hj  = a.  .  2 
To make the analysis more tractable, we  shall assume that firms ignore the 
dependency  on the relative price level. The cost of adjustment function  can 
then be written as 
(5a)  1  2  X 
where sj  = fij/fl and qfj  = 1/2ajg. A similar specification can be found in, among 
others, Rotemberg (1982), Henin and Zylberberg (1984) and Broer (1986). 
Denoting the discount factor by 
p  (t)--exp  -t  rs  ds) 
the value of the firm to be maximized is 
Vj  (0)  J  {  p(t)  0  ( tw()  p t  gj(t) - hj(t)3p(t) dt 
where w(t)  is the nominal  wage rate paid by firms. For the time being,  we 
assume that the supply of labour is infinitely elastic. Investment expenditure 
and adjustment costs are valued at the average price level. Decisions  made by 
the representative firm with regard to  prices are supposed  to  have only  an 
indirect effect on these amounts. Firms maximize  V subject to the constraints 
(1)-(5).  As observed in the Introduction, it may be optimal for the representa- 
tive firm to ration its customers. The constraint (2) should therefore be written 
as 
or 
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Multiplying both sides of the inequality by yj finally results in 
(  2b  )  paj  -  yjpj 
The model  has the  format of  an optimal  control problem with instrument 
variables  1, i, s  and  state variables  k, p. The  Hamiltonian  of  this  problem 
dropping firms' subscripts is 
(6)  H =p  y  g(i, k) -  S  + q(i -  k) 
{u+  a  y  )  -(y/  p  }  ]2 
The costate variables q and u/fl  are adjoint to the state variables k and p. 
The symbol z indicates a slack variable connected  with inequality (2b). The 
Lagrangean multiplier A relates to this demand constraint and can be inter- 
preted as the shadow price of sales revenue.3 
Necessary first-order conditions for an optimum dividing out equal terms 
are:4 
(7)  (p+AF)f  (k, l)=  w 
with 
(8)  gi(i, k) = q 
(9)  s=qiu 
(10)  Az=O 
(11)  j=(r+8)q-(Pjk)fk(k,  l)+gk(i,  k) 
p 
(12)  t=  (r+  iT)u-(1-A  )y 
where  1T=p/lF 
The complementary slackness  condition  (10)  implies  that A  > 0 if  z =0. 
We then have: CF  =  -(p/n)).  Substituting this result in (7) and (11) gives, for 
the case that consumers are not rationed, 
(7a)  (1  A  )Pf =  W 
(  Ia)  4=(r+8)q-(1  -A)f  k(k  l)+gk(i,  k). 
If z>  0 we have A =0  and equations (7a)  and (1 la)  are still valid. The full 
model describing optimal behaviour by firms consists of equations (1),  (2a), 1988]  PRICE  INERTIA  IN  MONOPOLISTIC  COMPETITION  207 
(3), (7a), (8), (9), (lla),  (12) and the complementary slackness condition (10) 
with A ? 0. 
Given the time paths of  w, p, r and initial values  k(O), p(O), the model 
gives a solution for y, 1, k, i, p, q, u, A and z for t >  0. There are two regimes 
possible,  depending  on the values of the exogenous  variables and the para- 
meters of the model. When A = 0 we have z > 0, and the firm is not operating 
on the demand curve for its product in the short run. Consumers are rationed, 
because labour is too expensive to produce according to demand. Under these 
circumstances demand is not binding and firms equate the marginal product 
of labour with the real wage rate. Such a situation of excess demand may arise 
because it takes time to adjust prices. In the terminology of Malinvaud (1977), 
the  economy  is  in the  'classical  regime' under these  circumstances. As the 
price of  output rises producers increase the supply of goods  and sooner or 
later the demand constraint will be binding (z = 0 and A  >  0). When this point 
is reached the price will go up further to exploit the monopolistic  position of 
the  firm. When  demand  determines what  can  be  supplied,  the  'Keynesian 
regime' prevails. 
The possibility  of rationing in case prices change over time is illustrated 
in Figure 1. Demand in the initial equilibrium is given by the curve D, whereas 
the marginal cost curve is indicated by MC. For simplicity, these curves are 
assumed to the linear. The initial equilibrium price p* and equilibrium output 
y* are found from the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue (MR). 
Upon impact of a demand shock from D  towards D',  firms will produce up 
to the point where the price equals marginal cost (y =  Y2).  With the price of 
output  unchanged,  consumers  demand  the  quantity  y  y3.  This  results in 




Y1  Y2  Y3 
FIGURE  1 
Dynamic price and quantity adjustment can be analysed more rigorously 
by ignoring for the time being  capital accumulation  and assuming that the 
stock of capital is constant. It then follows from equations (9) and (12), taking 
account of the definition of s, that, for the case of a long-run equilibrium with 
p = u = 0, we have A = 1. Therefore in a long-run equilibrium situation demand 
will be binding and producers will exploit their monopoly position according 
to the static theory of profit maximization. Now consider the dynamics in case 208  ECONOMICA  [MAY 
A remains positive (A  >  0, z = 0). From equations (2a), (7a), (9) and (12), the 
following  system of differential equations in p and u can then be derived:5 
(13)  u =rmu-  1-  1-  a  ( 
(14)  p=3u 
where rm(rr+  iT)  denotes  the nominal rate of  interest, which firms take as 
given. 
The phase diagram of the system is given in Figure 2(a).  The line p =0 
coincides  with the horizontal axis. The expression  for ti = 0 is more compli- 
cated. As shown in Appendix  1, the slope is negative for low values of p but 
is positive  at high values  of p. The main characteristics of the function  are 
captured by the line shown in Figure 2(a). As appears from inspection of (13) 
and (14), the long-run solution is a saddlepoint with the stable arm indicated 
by SS' in Figure 2(a). The phase diagram for the 'classical regime' (A = 0) is 
given in the  left part of  Figure 2(b).  The expression  for  ti =0  now  equals 
u = y/ rm. Because in this situation there is a positive relationship between y 
and p, the slope of the curve for ti = 0 is also positive. 
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Let us now  consider the  case of  an outward shift of  the demand curve 
starting from a long-run equilibrium at p*  in  Figures 2(a)  and 2(b).  If the 
demand constraint bites less,  A will fall. However,  A has a lower bound  of 
zero, and when this is attained there will be some slack. In Figure 2(a)  it is 
assumed that A remains strictly positive. Therefore, the system of differential 
equations  (13)  and  (14)  determines  the  adjustment process  from  the  old 
equilibrium indicated by p*  towards the new  long-run value p*.  Following 
the shock, the costate variable u jumps to a point on the stable arm of the 
saddlepoint p*. Output is raised to meet demand at the existing price p*. After 
this  initial  adjustment, firms gradually increase  prices  and  output  declines 
until the new equilibrium is attained. The movement along the stable manifold 
SS'  can be described by the differential equation 
(15)  P=  {(ll/)fP} 
where el < 0 is the stable root. 
In the case presented in Figure 2(b), the increase in demand is assumed 
to be larger and A has to be set at zero initially. There is still a jump in output 
at t = 0, but the rise in output is not enough to meet demand at the existing 
price level;  consumers are rationed in the  market for goods.  The 'classical 
regime' prevails, and the real wage rate equals the marginal product of labour. 
Firms adjust prices gradually and at p  =  p3  in Figure 2(b) a situation is reached 
where demand and supply are again equal.6 From then on A rises towards its 
eqdilibrium value unity and firms are able to exploit their monopoly position. 
It should be observed that the initial jump in u must be such that the stable 
arm of the saddlepoint p* must be attained when p equals p3. 
Changes in the nominal  wage rate w can be analysed in a similar way. 
However, in this case there is no initial change in output unless the change 
in w is large enough to lead to a regime switch. An increase in the wage rate, 
for example, leads to an upward adjustment of the output price over time and 
a decline in output. If the wage shock is relatively large, there may be a period 
of rationing of consumers to begin with. 
Things are different if capital accumulation is taken into account. Because 
the production function  and the cost of the adjustment function for capital 
are linear homogeneous,  an increase in demand induces a proportional rise 
in 1 and k in the long run. Therefore, the long-run equilibrium price remains 
unchanged. An increase in nominal wages induces capital-deepening. As can 
be easily seen from equations  (7a) and (11), the long-run equilibrium value 
of  the  price  level  will  now  be  higher. Assuming  saddlepoint  stability, the 
dynamics of the system can be described in a way analogous to our previous 
analysis with constant k. Upon impact of a shock, the costate variables q and 
u will jump to the stable arm (for A  >  0)  and adjustment towards the new 
long-run values will take place smoothly. In case the demand constraint is not 
binding initially things are more complicated, of course. 
II.  A  MACROECONOMIC  MODEL  WITH  ENDOGENEOUS  PRICE  ADJUSTMENT 
Before a macroeconomic model can be developed,  something has to be said 
about aggregation. To simplify, we assume that demand elasticities are uniform 210  ECONOMICA  [MAY 
across firms. Equation (2) can then be rewritten as 
n (p) 
with (Z  n 
pYjy)/fl  and n denoting the number of firms. Following Iwai (1981), 
Blanchard and  Kiyotaki  (1985)  and  Svensson  (1986),  the  formula  for the 
average price index can be represented by7 
(17) 
/1  n 
! 
\  1/(1  -q) 
n j=1 
It can be shown that the system of demand equations defined by (16) and (17) 
is consistent with maximization of the utility function: 
n 
(18)  U=  Z  y(71-l)/71 
j=1 
subject to the expenditure constraint 
n 
(19)  Z pjyj=iy. 
j=1 
In equilibrium all firms choose  the same price; hence pj = fj for all j.  Firms 
consider the prices of other firms as given. The equilibrium could therefore 
be called a Nash-rational expectations equilibrium as suggested by Rotemberg 
(1982). The necessary condition for an optimum at the firm level can now also 
be applied on the macroeconomic  level, where total demand (y)  equals the 
sum of aggregate consumption (c) and aggregate investment expenditure (g).8 
To complete the macroeconomic model with endogenous price changes, we 
need a consumption function and equations for the money market. Consumer 
behaviour  will  not  be  modelled  explicitly  and  is  therefore not  necessarily 
consistent with (18). Instead, we postulate a standard consumption function: 
(20)  c = c(y, r,  Q),  c1  > 0,  co  2  ?'  cr  _  0 
where Ql symbolizes real wealth: 
M 
f  = k+-. 
p 
The supply of money (M)  is exogenous, while the demand for money follows 
from the standard specification: 
M 
(21)  -=m(y,  r,Q1),  m  >0,  mn?0,  mr<0. 
p 
The nominal interest rate rather  than the real interest rate should be in equation 
(21). As observed by Blanchard (1983),  the present specification eliminates 
the  'Mundell  effect'. Labour supply  is  exogenous.  The  nominal  wage  rate 
responds to excess demand in the market for labour over time (see equation 
(22p)).  Following  Blanchard and Sachs (1982),  we assume that households 
supply all the labour demanded by firms, which means that firms are never 
constained  in the market for labour. The regime of  'repressed inflation' is 
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The full macroeconomic model can now be formulated as follows: 
(22a)  Yd  =  Cd +  g(i, k)  effective demand 
(22b)  ld  =  Id(Yd,  k)  Keynesian  demand  for 
labour 
(22c)  1 =, I(w  k)  demand for labour in case 
w  w  p,  of  rationing  in  the  goods 
market 
(22d)  Yw  =f(lw,  k)  output in case of  rationing 
in the goods  market 
(22e)  y = min (Yd, Yw)  actual output 
(22f)  1= min (Id,  lw)  actual employment 
(22g)  Cd  =  Cd (y, r, k)  consumption function 
(22h)  gi(i, k) = q  investment function 
(22i)  -=  m(y, r)  LM curve 
p 
(22j)A=ma  0  [w__1  Jj]  shadow price of  the sales 
(22j)  A =max  [0  {1fpf;(  k  Id)JJ  constraint 
(22k)  c =  Cd -  (Yd  -y)  rationing  rule  for  con- 
sumption 
(221)  k = i -8k  accumulation of capital 
(22m)  =(r+)q(1-  (l-  )fk(k,  l)+gk(i,  k)  costate variable for k 
(22n)  f=  qiup  price formation 
(22o)  u = (r+)  u-(1-A)y  costate variable for p 
p 
(22p)  W=  pw(l  -  )  wage formation 
Equation (22b) is the inverted production function determining labour demand 
if consumers are not rationed in the goods  market. When rationing prevails, 
labour demand is obtained by equating the marginal product of labour and 
the  real wage  rate, which  follows  from equation  (7a)  when  A =0.  Labour 
demand is then given by equation (22c). The corresponding output volume is 
found by substituting l, in the production function as shown in equation (22d). 
In models with monopolistic competition, it can be shown that the employ- 
ment function  has the  real wage  rate and  effective demand as explanatory 
variables, it the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price depends 
on  output  (see  for  instance  Layard and  Nickell,  1985).  In  our model  the 
employment  function  depends  upon  the  prevailing regime as follows  from 
equations (22b) and (22c). The assumption of a constant elasticity of demand 
is immaterial to this result. In the 'classical regime', effective demand has no 
influence on employment. In the 'Keynesian regime', the influence of the wage 
rate on labour demand is only indirect. The reason for this is that output prices 
are fixed in the short run. 212  ECONOMICA  [MAY 
It is assumed that only consumers are rationed in the market for goods. If 
total effective demand exceeds  actual output, then actual consumption  falls 
short of  effective consumers' demand by the  same amount, as can be seen 
from equation (22k). 
If the demand constraint is binding (A >  0), combining (22j) and (22m) gives 
(22m,)  4=(r+8)q--W-+fgk- 
p f' 
Fims invest to save labour costs. This result corresponds with the outcome in 
case of a Keynesian regime under perfect competition as discussed in Blanchard 
and Sachs (1982) and Van de Klundert and Peters (1986). For A = 0, we get 
(22m2)  4 = (r +  8)q  fk +  gk- 
This is the classical outcome: investment is governed by the return to capital. 
As shown by Hayashi (1982), the shadow price q is then equal to the observable 
average value of capital (Tobin's q).9 
In a stationary state we: k = q = i  =  i  =  w = 0. Substituting these conditions 
in equations (221)-(22p) gives the following long-run solutions: u* = 0, A* = 1, 
l* P=,  i* =  8k*.  It should be recalled that in the long-run equilibrium situation 
the demand constraint is binding (A = 1). 
The comparative statics of the long-run model are rather straightforward 
if the functions are properly specified.10  A change in labour supply (measured 
in efficiency units) then leads to a proportional mutation in the equilibrium 
value of the stock of capital. In this case the long-run rate of interest remains 
unaffected. An increase in the money stock induces an increase in the nominal 
price level with all other variables maintaining their value. Money is neutral 
in the long run. 
The impact of a shock depends among other things on the non-predeter- 
mined state variables q and u. The short-run impact of changes in exogenous 
variables and the process of adjustment towards a (new) long-run equilibrium 
can be traced by numerical examples. Applying the method of multiple shooting 
as explained in Lipton, et al. (1982), this will be done in the next section. The 
specification of functions applied and the chosen parameter values are given 
in Appendix 2. 
III.  SIMULATION  RESULTS  ON  A  MACROECONOMIC  LEVEL 
The results of  a once  and for all 5 per cent decrease in the money stock at 
t=0  are presented in Table 1. All variables (except  A and u)  are measured 
as percentage deviations from the original steady-state values. There are three 
roots with negative real parts and two roots with positive real parts correspond- 
ing to the number of, respectively, predetermined and non-predetermined state 
variables. Therefore the model exhibits saddlepoint stability. 
Money is not neutral in the short run if price changes are costly.  Firms 
accept lower profits from operations  because  it pays to  let prices decrease 
slowly. The resulting price rigidity causes a recession with a substantial decline 
in  output and employment.  A higher value  for  A (A > 1) points  to  a more 
binding demand constraint. These results are remarkable, because  the costs 1988]  PRICE  INERTIA  IN  MONOPOLISTIC  COMPETITION  213 
TABLE  1 
A 5  PER  CENT  DECREASE  IN  MONEY 
Period 
Variable  0  1  2  5  10  SS 
c  -4  1  -2-4  -1*4  -0*3  -0.1  0 
i  -3-1  -1  9  -1.1  -0*3  -0-2  0 
y  -4  1  -2-4  -1*4  -0*3  -0.1  0 
I  -6  5  -3*7  -2-0  -0-2  0.0  0 
r  6-4  4 0  2-7  0-8  0 3  0 
A  *  1110  1-07  1 05  1-01  1 00  1 
k  0  -0-2  -0.4  -0  4  -0*3  0 
q  -1-6  -0-8  -0  4  0.1  0.1  0 
p  0  -2-0  -3  3  -4  7  -4-8  -5 
u*  -0-3  -0-2  -0- 1  -0.0  0.0  0 
w  0  -2*5  -3-8  -5  0  -5  0  -5 
* Level. 
of price adjustment are moderate. From equation (5a), the adjustment costs 
of a 5 per cent change in price with  f=0-1  amount to 0-0125 in real terms. 
The cumulative loss in output exceeds this number by far. Over the first ten 
periods, the cumulative output gap is already equal to 10 per cent of the initial 
steady-state value, which in the present example comes down to an absolute 
amount of 0-12. 
There is of course no contradiction involved. The number of firms is large 
and each firm must incur the cost of price adjustment. To put it differently, 
the output figures in Table 1 are macroeconomic results, which must be split 
up among a large number of firms. There is no monopoly  of supply on the 
macroeconomic  level.  Instead,  there  are  many  firms observing  their  own 
demand  curve. As  our numerical example,  based  on  reasonable  values  of 
parameters, shows, small costs of price adjustment under these circumstances 
have important consequences for output and employment. A similar argument 
has been put forward by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1985) with regard to the 
significance of administrative cost or small menu cost. Following a suggestion 
in Akerlof and Yellen  (1985a, b), the envelope  theorem is applied to argue 
that second-order menu costs will prevent each firm from changing its price, 
given the prices of  other firms. It should  be clear that the interpretation of 
macroeconomic  results does  not  depend  on  the  cause  of  adjustment costs. 
Essential in both cases is a demand externality related to the market form of 
monopolistic  competition.  By changing the prices of their own good,  firms 
can move  along the demand  curve facing them, but they can not alter the 
position of the curve: only if other firms change their prices will the demand 
curve shift. 
Changes in the stock of capital are of minor importance. The decline in 
capacity raises marginal labour cost in the medium run, but the fall in real 
wages has an opposite effect. Not much harm would be done if in the present 
case capital accumulation would be left out. 
Ignoring the possibility of 'repressed inflation', the result of an increase in 
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adjust prices slowly. Profits from operations are below their long-run equili- 
brium level, which is now reflected in a value of A below unity. Consumers 
are not rationed unless  A falls below zero. Things would be different in the 
case  of  perfect competition  and price formation based  on  excess  demand. 
Then, a positive  demand shock leads upon  impact to  a 'classical disequili- 
brium',  because  meeting  demand  would  mean  suffering  a  loss.  In  case 
monopolistic  competition prevails, monopoly profits serve as a buffer, which 
enables firms to  meet demand.  It is only when the shock is very large that 
producing according to demand may imply that the price of output does not 
cover marginal (labour) cost. In such a situation, firms decide to ration their 
customers until prices have risen sufficiently. The mainly symmetrical output 
response in the case of imperfect competition gives the model a more Keynesian 
flavour compared with the competitive model. Our next example of a negative 
supply shock also illustrates this point. 
The results presented in Table 2 relate to  a permanent decline  in total 
factor productivity of 5 per cent at t= 0. This corresponds to a decline in labour 
quality of  7-9  per cent  for  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with  an 
elasticity of production with regard to labour of 0-625. As shown in Section 
II, the capital stock decreases at the same rate in the long run, whereas the 
long-run rate of interest does not change. With the stock of money given, the 
price level increases to compensate for the fall in output in the long term. The 
real wage rate falls because the supply of labour is perfectly inelastic. 
TABLE  2 
A 5  PER  CENT  DECREASE  IN  PRODUCTIVITY 
Period 
Variable  0  1  2  5  10  SS 
c  -2-7  -4.8  -5-7  -6.0  -6-1  -7.9 
i  -2-0  -3.7  -4-5  -5  0  -5.4  -7  9 
y  -2.7  -4-8  -5.7  -6-0  -6-1  -7.9 
1  440  0.6  -0.7  -0.7  0.0  0 
r  -16-5  -12-3  -10-1  -7-7  -6.7  0 
A  *  0073  0.86  0-93  1-00  1-00  1 
k  0  -0-3  -0-7  -1.7  -3-1  -7-9 
q  -1.0  -1.7  -1.9  -1-7  -1-2  0 
p  0  3-0  4.3  5-1  5.4  8-6 
U*  004  0.2  0 1  0.0  0-0  0 
w  0  1-0  0-9  -0e5  -1.1  0 
* Level. 
Things are different in the short run. The lower productivity level reduces 
the profitability of investment. Effective demand is even further depressed by 
the multiplier mechanism. The demand constraint bites, however, less (A < 1) 
because there is a downward pressure on supply in case of an increase in cost. 
As long as A is positive,  firms produce what can be sold  at the going price 
even if they have to hire more labour. The rise in employment underlines the 
demand-oriented character of the model.  In a competitive world with price 166  ECONOMICA  [MAY 
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FIGURE  1.  Overshooting exchange rate. 
between  the old and new rates of monetary expansion (,u'-,u).  Output will 
be unaffected. The impact effect on the price of foreign exchange (equal to 
the effect on domestic prices) will be exactly sufficient to offset the effect on 
money demand of the fall in the nominal interest rate. Since money demand 
is assumed to be negatively related to the nominal interest rate, this means a 
drop in the price of foreign exchange at time zero.  In Figure 1 we show the 
new price of foreign exchange in this case as eo =  e'. 
When  domestic  prices are sluggish (and assuming for the  moment  that 
output is not sensitive to exchange rate and price developments-y  = 0)  the 
new price of foreign exchange at time zero  (eo) will not equal e'. Although 
we assume that the price of foreign exchange will converge to the new steady 
state,  the sluggishness of domestic prices means that there would be excess 
demand for money at e' and the new steady-state  nominal interest rate. In 
fact, the new money market equilibrium at time zero will be achieved with a 
lower price of foreign exchange eo <  e' and a higher nominal interest rate than 
on the new steady-state  path. In other words, the exchange rate overshoots 
the steady-state path. 
This result also holds true for several other specifications of the domestic 
price sluggishness. For any specification for which the exchange rate converges 
monotonically  to the new steady-state  path, there will be an exchange  rate 
overshoot  at time  zero  in the  absence  of  output  effects.  The  force  of  this 
condition can be seen from Figure 1: convergence of the exchange rate requires 
the slope of the exchange rate path at time zero to be no greater for e>  e' 
than the slope of the new steady-state path, but since the slope of the exchange 




y=  lak  -  production function 
g = i(1  +  investment expenditure function 
M 
-  = xyr;  liquidity preference function 
p 
Parameter values  should  be  based  on  empirical  estimates  and  lead  to  reasonable 
outcomes for important ratios in the economy. 
The full set of parameter values used in computations is given by 
a=0-625  ,l3=0-5  y=08  5=O1  0I  1 
;=0-15  =5  0=5  X=0-25  0=O1. 
The chosen values of the exogenous  variables are 
s=1,  M = 100. 
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NOTES 
1. With lump-sum type costs  of  price adjustment, it is straightforward that, in response to a 
shock,  adjustment for the  individual  firm would  occur either all at once  or not at all. Of 
course, with a large number of different firms  the economy may still display smooth behaviour. 
2.  The specification of equation (2a) is reminiscent of the dynamic monopoly problem introduced 
by Evans (1924) and discussed  in Allen (1938). 
3.  Our treatment of the inequality constraint on demand is based on Broer (1986, Chapter 3). 
For a more general discussion of inequality constraints in optimal control problems, see for 
instance Hadley and Kemp (1971, Chapter 5). 
4.  In addition, we have the usual transversality conditions: 
lim p(t)q(t)k(t)=O  and  lim p(t)p(t)=O. 
,-0  t  ,00 
5. The marginal product of labour f,  depends upon p through y and 1. 
6.  The value of p3  can be found from equations: f1(l, k) = wlp  and f(l,  k) = a(p/p)-"'. 
7.  In Svensson (1986) there is a continuum of firms defined by the unit interval 0O<j? 1, where 
each firm is indexed by j. 1988]  PRICE INERTIA  IN MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION  217 
8.  The implication of this approach is that investment goods are of different quality, and qualities 
are chosen according to preferences specified in equation (18). This is the 'price' to be paid 
if one wants to avoid the modelling of a two-sector economy. 
9.  It should be noted that this result is obtained under the condition of constant returns to scale 
both in production and installation: the functions f  and g are linear homogeneous.  Costs of 
price adjustment ought to be ignored. 
10. According to  Rose  (1966),  the consumption  function  should  be  homogeneous  of  the first 
degree in y and k. 
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